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This paper takes stock of the forces that lie behind the recent rise of preferential agreements in services 
trade. Its focuses first on a number of distinguishing features of services trade that sets it apart from trade 
in goods and shapes trade liberalization and rule-making approaches in the services field. The paper then 
documents the nature, modal and sectoral incidence of the trade and investment preferences spawned by 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in services. It does so with a view to addressing the question: how 
“preferential” is the preferential treatment of services trade? Finally, the paper addresses a number of 
considerations arising from attempts to multilateralize preferential access and rule-making in services 
trade.  
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One  of  the  striking  features  of  trade  diplomacy  in  recent  years  has  been  the 
seemingly unstoppable march of preferential trade liberalization and rule‐making. 



















II. What  is  special  about services trade? 
 
We consider first the salient features of services trade that distinguish it from trade in 
















preferential  market  opening  and  distinguishing  the  trade  creating  and  trade 
diverting properties of PTAs pioneered by Jacob Viner2 is almost assuredly of lesser 
analytical  relevance in the services field. Given that barriers to services trade are  
often  prohibitive  and  their  removal  seldom  revenue‐generating,  and  the  fact  that 
trade in services is more often constrained by quantitative restrictions than by overtly 
discriminatory  practices,  one  may  reasonably  expect  that  determined  efforts  at 
dismantling service sector restrictions will result in lower costs of trade diversion 






                                                 
1 This is true of services delivered through Modes 2, 3 and 4. 
2 See Viner (1950). 
3 Mode 4 trade refers to the temporary admission of business people and professionals and other contract-based 
service supliers engaged in the cross-border delivery of labour-based services.     5
more in services than in goods trade. This is because location‐specific sunk costs of 
production  often  assume  considerable  importance  in  several  key  service  sectors, 
particularly  those  with  infrastructural  and/or  network  properties  such  as 
telecommunications,  energy  distribution,  or  transportation.  In  such  sectors,  even 
temporarily  privileged  access  for  an  inferior  supplier  can  translate  into  durable 
longer‐term market advantages deterring market future contestability.  
 
III.  Implicit preference margins: country, sectoral and modal 
patterns 
 
For  a  number  of  reasons  rooted  in  the  political  economy  of  novelty,  regulatory 





the  Uruguay  Round,  the  fact  remains  that,  in  most  countries,  developed  and 
developing,  market  opening  in  services  has  primarily  proceeded  along  unilateral 




For  instance,  the  average  level  of  Mode  3  (commercial  presence)  access  granted 
unilaterally via recent legislative changes in India is close to 70 percent in a number 
of key sectors, much higher than the 10 percent foreign equity ceiling embedded in 
India’s  initial  (i.e.  Uruguay  Round)  GATS  commitments  and  significantly  higher 
than  the  44.8  percent  average  level  of  foreign  equity  put  forward  in  its  latest 
conditional offer in the Doha Round (Gasiorek et al., 2007).  
   6
Beyond  unilateral  liberalization,  a  growing  number  of  WTO  Members  have 
simultaneously turned to PTAs to deepen and quicken the pace of market opening in 
services  markets.  More  often  than  not,  and  particularly  when  conducted  along 
North‐South  lines  and  in  agreements  that  resort  to  a  negative  list  approach  to 
scheduling  market  opening  undertakings,  PTA  commitments  in  services  tend  to 
approximate  and  often  lock‐in  the  regulatory  status  quo  flowing  from  recently 












Drawing  on  the  work  of  Marchetti  and  Roy  (2008),  Table  1  below  compares  the 
average level of commitments scheduled under Modes 1 (cross‐border supply) and 3 
(commercial  presence)  by  OECD  and  non‐OECD  countries  under  the  Uruguay 




                                                 
4 For a fuller discussion of recent trends in services liberalization and rule-making in PTAs, see Mattoo and 
Sauvé (2010).  
5 NAFTA refers tot he 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement linking Canada, the United States and 
Mexico; ANZCERTA is the 1987 Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement between Australia and New 


















Table 1: Comparing the level of services trade and investment 
liberalization across country groupings and modes of supply 
 
GATS DDA Offer (0 to 100) PTAs GATS/PTA (%) DDA/PTA (%) Preference Margin (%)
Total score 27 34 63 43 54 56‐57
Mode 12 4 3 0 5 9 4 1 5 1 4 9 ‐59
Mode 33 0 3 8 6 7 4 5 5 7 4 3 ‐55
OECD
Mode 14 3 5 1 5 9 7 3 8 6 1 4 ‐27
Mode 35 3 5 9 6 7 7 9 8 8 1 2 ‐21
Non‐OECD
Mode 11 8 2 3 6 0 3 0 3 8 6 2 ‐70



















Sectors GATS  DDA Offers (o to 100) PTAs GATS/PTAs (%) DDA/PTAs (%) Preference Margin 
Professional 30 39 67 45 58 42‐55
Computer 55 74 93 59 80 20‐41
Postal/Courrier 14 20 53 26 38 62‐74
Telecoms 51 58 80 64 73 28‐36
Audiovisual 17 20 50 34 40 60‐66
Construction 40 46 75 53 61 39‐47
Distribution 32 41 76 42 54 46‐58
Education 18 25 57 32 44 56‐68
Environmental 20 30 62 32 48 52‐68
Financial 36 40 53 68 75 25‐32
Health 8 11 34 24 32 68‐76
Tourism 51 61 83 61 73 27‐39
Maritime 12 23 57 21 40 60‐79
Rail 14 20 52 27 38 62‐73
Road  16 18 56 29 32 68‐71




Interestingly,  the  two  sectors  with  the  lowest  implicit  preference  margins  are 
financial and telecommunication services, both of which were negotiated on a stand‐






Meanwhile,  the  large  margins  of  preference  (i.e.  the  much  greater  level  of  PTA 
liberalization relative to the GATS or the latest DDA offer) that characterize sectors 
such as audio‐visual, transport (all modes), health or education services need to be 







In  the  case  of  transportation  services,  preferential  advances  most  likely  reflect 
gravity‐related  considerations  as  countries  that  share  contiguous  borders  are 






                                                 
6 The Uruguay Round’s overtime negotiations in services also featured rapidly stillborn talks on maritime 
transport and Mode 4 trade, suggesting that sector- or modal-specific dynamics may, alongside constraints on 
reciprocal bargaining, play a key role in explaining the level of observed liberalization advances in services 
trade.  
7 A ‘veto player’ is an individual or collective actor who has to agree for the legislative (or negotiating) status 
quo to change. See Tsebelis (2002).    10
IV.  More (or less) than meets the eye? How “preferential” is 
preferential liberalization in services trade? 
 
Tables  1  and  2  above  reveal  a  landscape  of  significant  contrast  in  liberalization 
















many  regulatory  settings,  particularly  in  resource‐poor  environments,  this  may 
reflect weak enforcement capacity and indeed a recognition that maintaining parallel 
regulatory regimes – one for insiders, another for third country suppliers, may result 
in  undue  regulatory  compliance  and/or  enforcement  costs.  As  an  example,  the 
number  of  partners  in  Indian  accountancy  firms  is  restricted  to  20.  If  such  a 
restriction were to be relaxed, it would be extremely difficult in practice to limit it to 
preferential suppliers. Similarly, much prudential regulation in financial markets or 
regulation  targeting  consumer  or  environmental  protection  concerns  cannot 
                                                 









countries  and  home  country  users  or  consumers.  Preferential  access  to  a  services 
supplier  could  initially  be  in  terms  of  market  access,  national  treatment  and/or 
regulatory  requirements  (e.g.  licensing  conditions).  As  noted  earlier,  these  can 
translate into significant privileges in the domestic market once the foreign supplier 
has  established  a  presence  in  it.  As  an  example,  one  may  think  of  a  retail  chain 
opening an outlet as part of a preferential agreement in a hitherto closed market. 
Such preferential market access could afford an incumbent significant advantages in 
terms  of  captive  domestic  clients  and  resources ‐  access  to  land,  labour,  capital, 
entrepreneurship – and knowledge and use of the supply chain. These benefits may 
be  sufficient  to  give  it  a  competitive  advantage  even  if  it  is  inferior  to  more 
competitive suppliers from excluded countries. Such incumbency advantages could 







will  determine  the  extent  to  which  non‐members  can  benefit  from  trade  or 
investment  preferences.  The  multilateral  disciplines  of  the  GATS,  embedded  in 
                                                 
9For a fuller discussion of the economics and law of rules of origin in services trade, see Beviglia-Zampetti and 
Sauvé (2006) and Miroudot, Savaga and Sudreau (2010).   12


































or  permanent  residents  of  PTA  partners.  However,  it  bears  recalling  that  such 
restrictions  affect  a  mode  of  supply  that  accounts  for  less  than  5%  of  aggregate 
services trade.  
 




to  governments  and  business  constituencies  concerned  by  the  liberalization  and 






There  is  generally  little  debate  over  the  fact  that  services  PTAs  offer  economic 
welfare gains relative to the status quo ex‐ante. One cannot however deny that the 
gains  from  multilateral  liberalization  are  likely  to  be  larger  as  MFN‐based 
competition  is  unbiased  and  the  first‐mover  advantages  of  possibly  second‐best 
service  providers  are  thwarted.  To  the  extent  that  WTO  Members  undertake 





alternative  is  perhaps  to  seek  practical  means  of  multilateralizing  service  sector 
preferences.  
 
















VII  on  Recognition10  Article  VII.2  of  GATS  states  that  “members  of  a  mutual 
recognition  arrangement  (MRA)  shall  provide  adequate  opportunity  for  other 
interested excluded countries to negotiate their accession to such an arrangement or 
to  negotiate  comparable  arrangements”.  Article  VII.4(b)  further  states  that  “such 
arrangements should be notified to the Council for Trade in Services well in advance 
                                                 
10 Recognition is the act of recognizing the education or experience of a foreign service provider for the purpose 
of meeting the domestic country’s authorization, licensing or certification requirements and is especially 
important in the case of trade in professional services. Such recognition can be accorded autonomously or can be 
embedded in an arrangement or agreement with the interested country(ies)- the latter takes the form of a Mutual 





Significantly,  however,  the  above  provisions  have  not  enticed  WTO  Members  to 
extend MRA benefits to third country suppliers to the extent that they have chosen to 
notify  these  under  the  “closed”  integration  provisions  of  Article  V  of  the  GATS  
which does not afford non‐members an opportunity to accede to such an MRA. One 
means  to  multilateralize  bilateral  or  plurilateral  MRAs  would  be  to  make  it 




regulatory  cooperation,  including  in  matters  of  recognition  and  labour  market 
cooperation.  Under  such  rules,  MRAs  concluded  among  geographically  distant 
countries  (i.e.  trans‐regional  PTAs)  would  need  to  be  notified  under  the  “open 
regionalism” provisions of Article VII:2 GATS.              
 
Matto  &  Sauvé  (2010)  have  suggested  another  possibility  wherein  PTA  members 
could be required to pre‐commit to future multilateral liberalization by signalling a 
precise time‐frame over which preferential treatment would be progressively eroded 
and/or  eliminated.  An  alternative  to  the  above  prescription  would  once  again 
proceed  along  geographical  proximity  lines,  by  allowing  Parties  to  PTAs  among 
contiguous or geographically proximate (i.e. forming a common geographical space) 












accords  can  be  modified  and/or  future  accords  negotiated.  Alternatively,  WTO 



























Hoekman,  Bernard  (2006).  ‘Liberalizing  Trade  in  Services:  A  Survey,’  World  Bank 
Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4030. 
 
Marchetti,  Juan  &  Martin  Roy  (2008).  ‘Services  Liberalization  in  the  WTO  and  in 
PTAs,’  in  Marchetti,  J.  and  M.  Roy,  eds.,  Opening  Markets  for  Trade  in  Services: 
Countries  and  Sectors  in  Bilateral  and  WTO  Negotiations,  Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 61‐112.  
 
Miroudot,  Sébastien,  Jehan  Sauvage  an  Marie  Sudreau  (2010),  Multilateralising 




Fink,  Carsten  and  Aaditya  Mattoo  (2002).  ‘Regional  Agreements  and  Trade  in 
Services: Policy Issues,’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2852, June. 
 
Mattoo,  Aaditya  and  Pierre  Sauvé  (2003),  Domestic  Regulation  and  Services  Trade 
Liberalization, Washington, D.C.: Oxford University Press for the World Bank. 
 
Mattoo, Aaditya and Pierre Sauvé (2010). ‘The Preferential Liberalization of Services Trade,’ 
NCCR Working Paper No 2010/13, (May), Bern: World Trade Institute, http://www.nccr-
trade.org/publication/the-preferential-liberalization-of-services-trade-lessons-from-practice/ 
 
Tsebelis, George (2002), Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Viner, Jacob (1950), The Customs Union Issue.  New York: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace.                      